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Different from the direct contact in epidemics spread, overload failures 
propagate through hidden functional dependencies. Many studies focused on the 
critical conditions and catastrophic consequences of cascading failures. However, 
to understand the network vulnerability and mitigate the cascading overload 
failures, the knowledge of how the failures propagate in time and space is 
essential but still missing. Here we study the spatio-temporal propagation 
behavior of cascading overload failures analytically and numerically. The 
cascading overload failures are found to spread radially from the center of the 
initial failure with an approximately constant velocity. The propagation velocity 
decreases with increasing tolerance, and can be well predicted by our theoretical 
framework with one single correction for all the tolerance values. This 
propagation velocity is found similar in various model networks and real 
network structures. Our findings may help to predict and mitigate the dynamics 
of cascading overload failures in realistic systems.  
Resilience of individual components in networks is determined not only by their own 
intrinsic properties, but also by their functional interactions with other components. 
For example, a failure of one component in a network may lead to overloads and 
failures of other components. Starting with a localized failure, such interactions 
between components can ignite a domino-like cascading failure, which may result in 
catastrophes such as those observed in many realistic networks [1-5]. The devastating 
consequences of these cascading failures have stimulated extensive studies [6-9].  
Many studies provided deep insight on the conditions and outcome of cascading 
failures [10-17], which may help to evaluate the system resilience. However, to 
predict and mitigate the failure spreading in a network, understanding their 
spatio-temporal propagation properties is essential but still missing. Different from 
structural cascading failures caused by direct causal dependencies [18-20], overload 
failures [21-25] usually propagate through invisible paths as a result of cooperative 
interactions in the system. Actually, a fundamental question has rarely been posed: 
how overload failures propagate with time in space during the cascading process? 
Indeed, predicting the spatio-temporal propagation of cascading failures could 
determine the timing and resource allocation of an effective mitigation strategy in 
corresponding self-healing technologies.  
In this paper, we aim to understand the spatio-temporal propagation of the cascading 
overload failures in spatially embedded systems. We define two basic quantities to 
describe the spatio-temporal propagation properties of cascading failures. The first 
quantity, rc(t), is the average Euclidean distance of the failures appearing at cascading 
step t from the center of the initial failure. The second quantity, Fr(t), is the number of 
node failures that occur at cascading step t. While rc can help system regulators to set 
a ‘firewall’ at suitable locations before the failure arrives, Fr can suggest the ‘height’ 
of the firewall.  
Model 
In order to study the propagation properties of cascading overload failures, we model 
the network as a randomly weighted L × L lattice with periodic boundaries, where L 
is the linear length of the lattice. The weight of each link is taken from a Gaussian 
distribution N(μ, σ2) with mean weight μ and the disorder is represented by the 
standard deviation σ. In this model, the load on a node i, Li, represents the number of 
optimal paths between all pairs of nodes passing through this node [21-22]. A node i 
will fail when its load Li is more than (1+α) times its original load, where α 
represents the system tolerance to overloads [22]. A randomly localized region of the 
system is initially removed to trigger the cascading overloads. This kind of initial 
failure is motivated by the fact that natural disasters (like earthquake or floods) or 
malicious attacks (like WMD) usually occur in specific geographical locations and 
destroy initially localized regions of the network [25-27]. The initial failure is located 
in a randomly selected square of l × l nodes (𝑙 ≪ 𝐿), which are removed initially. In 
addition to being realistic, since failures are usually localized, this configuration can 
also help us to follow and analyze the spatio-temporal propagation pathway of the 
cascading failures. This local failure may trigger failures of other nodes if their load 
value exceeds the tolerance threshold due to the load redistribution across the entire 
network. Given the periodic boundary conditions, we can position the initial attack 
region at the center of the lattice.  
Propagation properties of cascading overload failures 
In Fig. 1 we show snapshots of the simulated cascading failures, where the failures 
spread almost radially from the initial attack region and finally spread over the whole 
system. As can be seen from Fig. 1, the nodes with spatial location closer to the initial 
failure begin to fail first and form approximately a ‘ring of failures’. The ring begins 
to grow and expand with time until it reaches the system’s boundary.  
Considering the ring shape of the cascading overload failures (originating from the 
initial location), it is reasonable to quantify rc(t) and Fr(t) at cascading step t. Figure 
2a shows that the propagation radius of cascading failures is increasing almost 
linearly with time for different system sizes. This means that the failures spread 
during the cascade process with an almost constant speed (slope of rc(t)). It can be 
seen that as the system linear size L increases, the propagation velocity of overload 
failures increases. The propagation radius of failures is increasing with time and 
becomes saturated near the boundary. The propagation size of failure Fr (number of 
new failures at each instant) increases until a certain time step and then decreases (Fig. 
2b). The behavior at large t is due to the finite size of the system, when rc(t) reaches 
the order of L the amount of damage can only decrease. Note that for different system 
sizes, the propagation size of failure Fr reaches the maximum at similar instants, 
which results from the higher velocity in larger system sizes.  
To further understand the effect of system size and tolerance α on failure propagation 
rc(t), we rescale it in Fig. 2c by the system linear size L. We find that the curves of 
rescaled rc collapse into a single curve for different system sizes at a given tolerance α, 
suggesting that failures spread in the same relative velocities for different system 
sizes. When the size of failures, Fr(t), is rescaled by the system size, L×L, the 
different curves of Fr(t)/L2 also collapse into a single curve. It can be seen that the 
spreading time needed to reach the maximum Fr(t)/L2	  is determined by	  the	  tolerance	  α,	  
which implies that large tolerance can postpone the collapse of the system. As seen in 
Fig. S6 (see SI for more details), there exists a critical value of α, αc, above which no 
spreading occurs. Moreover, in the next section we find the theoretical relation 
(shown in Fig. S5 in the SI) between the system tolerance and the critical initial 
failure size, above which the overload failures will spread out. As seen, for a larger α, 
the system can sustain a larger size of initial failure.  
In contrast to the dynamics such as epidemics [28] that propagate due to 
nearest-neighboring interactions such as contact infection, cascading overloads 
propagate as a result of the global interaction between all the flows contributed by the 
whole system. Surprisingly, although the interactions are global, the propagation 
dynamics in the model network and realistic networks (see SI for more examples) are 
found rather local. Here the local propagation means that there is a finite 
characteristic distance (Δrc) between the successive overloads. This characteristic 
distance is the value of propagation velocity (see Fig. 5a), which increases 
non-linearly with decreasing tolerance. The nearest-neighbor propagation of 
overloads usually assumed in some complex network models only corresponds to the 
limiting case of this local propagation (Δrc = 1).  
To further explore these propagation behaviors of cascading failures found in 
simulations and their relations with tolerance, we develop the following theory. 
Theory 
 
Cascading overload failures due to an initial local failure are produced by the 
redistribution of loads in the network. From the observations of simulations on 
weighted network, we find (see Fig. 1) that failures spread in a ring shape from the 
center of the initial damage. This inspires us to assume in our theory that the network 
is embedded in a two dimensional circular plate (see Fig. 3), the initial failure is 
within a (red) circle of radius a, and the main overload due to traffic from a given 
node A around the initial failure is located in the (green) ring adjacent to the initial 
failure (see the green ring in Fig. 3), whose size will be determined by the theory. The 
overload is reflected by the increase of the number and lengths of shortest paths 
passing through this ring. If the overload exceeds the capacity tolerance of a node 
((1+α) times its original load) within the adjacent ring, the node will fail in the next 
step, causing the cascading failure to propagate forward. Due to the initial failed area, 
shortest paths from a given node A to destinations located in the shadow area s (the 
dotted area in Fig. 3) would be affected and become longer, since they now have to 
surround the failed area. Specifically, the shortest paths from A to nodes in s (e.g., AF) 
across the failed area can be separated into two parts in the adjacent ring (e.g., BC and 
DE). For the first part, its length within the ring changes from BC to KG. As for the 
second part, its overload on the ring can be calculated from symmetry by switching A 
and F (source and target). Finally, the integration from r = a to r = 1 covers all the 
overloads added to the adjacent ring (green) due to the initial failure, can be written as   
                        ∆𝐿! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 𝑟! − 𝑎!𝑠 𝑎, 𝑟 − 𝑣 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑟 𝑠 𝑎, 𝑟 + 𝜋𝑎! 2𝜋𝑟𝑑𝑟 +!!                                                                               𝑏! − 𝑎!𝑠 𝑎, 𝑟 − 𝑣 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑟 𝑠 𝑎, 𝑟 + 𝜋𝑎! 2𝜋𝑟𝑑𝑟!! ,     (1) 
where the length of KG is 𝑏! − 𝑎! for r>b and 𝑟! − 𝑎! for r≤b, s(a, r) is the 
area of s, i.e., the number of A’s destinations in the shadow and v(a, b, r) is the 
average length of the first part of shortest paths (within the adjacent ring) before the 
failure. Similarly, we can obtain the initial load of nodes located within the circle 
centered at O with radius b as Lini(b) (see Sec. S1.2 in the SI). Then, for a node on the 
circle centered O with radius b, the overload produced by the failure is  
                              ∆𝐿 = !!!" !!" ∆𝐿! 𝑎, 𝑏 ,                   (2) 
and its initial load is  
                        𝐿! = !!!" !!" 𝐿!"!(𝑏).                     (3) 
For each functional node in the network, the critical condition for failure can be 
written as α=ΔL/L0. Specifically, if α≥ΔL/L0, it survives otherwise it fails. More 
details for the solution of the theoretical model can be found in the SI. 
As can be seen in Fig. 4, our theoretical analysis reproduces well the spatio-temporal 
propagation features of cascading overloads found in the simulations (Fig. 2). 
Specifically, as shown in Figs. 4a and 4c, the velocity of the failure propagation is 
almost constant in most of the time t, and decreases with increasing tolerance or 
decreasing system size. As shown in Figs. 4b and 4d, the number of failures increases 
with time and then begins to drop after reaching the peak, which is reduced by 
increasing the tolerance α. The instant for the maximal failure size is independent of 
the system size, but increases with the system tolerance. Moreover, similar to 
simulation results, both the radius and size of failures in the cascades can also be 
rescaled with system size (L and L2 respectively) as seen in Figs. 4c and 4d, where the 
different curves for different system sizes collapse into a single curve at a given α. 
Note that both rc(t) and Fr(t) demonstrate a small slope in the few initial steps, which 
is caused by the extremely small initial failure considered in the theory. As shown in 
the SI (Fig. S3), if the initial size of attack is large, both quantities show a higher 
slope also in the few initial cascading steps. 
To test our theory, we perform a quantitative comparison between the simulation and 
the theoretical model. As shown in Fig. 5a, the propagation velocity in different 
model networks and real networks can be well predicted by the theory with the same 
constant correction for all the values of tolerances. This constant correction, close to 2
π, is a result of the anisotropic propagation of overloads in the simulation, which is 
assumed isotropic in the theory. These good agreements between theory and 
simulations support the validity of our proposed theoretical framework for cascading 
overloads.  
 
The local propagation found in the simulation and theory is due to the mechanism of 
overload redistribution. In the simulation of the Motter-Lai model in Fig. 5b, the 
overloads propagate rather locally (within a characteristic distance) after an initial 
damage due to the redistribution of optimal paths between existing pairs of nodes. 
The optimal paths that passed through the previous damaged area will now mainly be 
redistributed close to this area, leading to the local overloads in spite of global 
interactions. Similar to our findings in the Motter-Lai model, the overloads in the 
theory (as shown in Fig. 5b) are found here mainly distributed close to the previous 
damage area, which causes the local propagation of failures. Note the agreement in 
Fig. 5b between theory and simulations (with the same constant correction of 2π, due 
to the anisotropic nature of the failure spreading, which is assumed isotropic in the 
theory). The excellent agreement between simulations and theory of the overload (in 
Fig. 5b) as a function of distance from the original failure also supports our theoretical 
approach.   
 
It is worth noting that the analysis of our theoretical framework is not limited by the 
computational complexity of calculating optimal paths. This is in contrast to 
simulations based on betweenness (number of optimal paths passing through a node), 
which require heavy computations and therefore are limited to relatively small 
systems. Our theoretical framework thus provides an efficient way to explore and 
understand the cascading behavior of failures for any system size. 
 
Universality of propagation velocity 
To explore the possibility of universal feature in overload propagation, here we 
analyze the propagation of cascading overload failures on different network models 
and realistic networks. Besides the model networks including lattice, circular lattice, 
planar graph and circular plate, we also study the overload propagation on the realistic 
road networks [29]. We initiate a local attack in the geographical center of these 
networks and analyze the spatio-temporal evolution of rc and Fr. As shown in Fig. 5 
(see SI for more examples), we find that propagation velocity of overloads is similar 
in various model and real network structures, which can be well predicted by our 
theory. The propagation velocity is independent of detailed network structures, which 
makes our findings more applicable. This universal propagation of overloads can be 
attributed to the common mechanism of overload redistribution in different networks, 
independent of structure difference between these networks. Furthermore, both theory 
and simulations suggest that for a given system size and a given tolerance, the size of 
initial failure does not influence the spreading velocity (see Fig. S14 in the SI).  
Discussion 
Cascading failures represent the manifestation of nonlinear butterfly effect in 
infrastructure networks, which can cause catastrophic damages due to a small local 
disturbance. The Motter-Lai-type overload cascade models are an important class of 
cascading failure dynamics, characterized by the nonlocal---in contrast to epidemic 
spreading-type local cascade models---interactions, and have been studied extensively 
for the last decade. Given the inherent global interactions in the mechanism of 
overload formation, it is of interest that the overloads spread rather locally from the 
initial attack region, at velocity that increases non-linearly with decreasing tolerance. 
Here the local propagation means that there is a finite characteristic distance between 
the successive overloads, which is the value of propagation velocity. The 
nearest-neighboring propagation of overloads usually assumed in some complex 
network models only corresponds to the limiting case of this local propagation 
(characteristic distance is 1).  
For different model and realistic networks, our results suggest the existence of 
universal propagation features of cascading overloads, which are characterized by a 
finite linear propagation velocity. This velocity can be predicted by our theory with 
the same constant correction for all the values of tolerances. This constant correction, 
close to 2π, is a result of the anisotropic propagation of overloads in the simulation, 
which is assumed isotropic in the theory. This universal behavior comes from the 
common global mechanisms of overload redistributions in different networks. When 
certain extreme heterogeneous networks like embedded scale free networks are 
considered, a revision of the theoretical framework may be needed. While the focus of 
this manuscript is on the spatio-temporal propagation of the cascading overload 
failures in spatially embedded systems, the overloads may spread very fast in general 
non-spatially-embedded sparse network due to its small diameter. 
The present study may help to bridge the longstanding gap between the overload 
model [16, 22] and the model of dependency links proposed by Buldyrev et al. [13] 
and Parshani et al. [18], in particular the lattice version of the model [19-20] where 
dependency links can have a characteristic length r. Indeed, as can be seen in Figs. 2 
and 4, overload failures propagate in a nearly constant speed, which suggests a 
characteristic dependency distance, between successive overload failures. 
Furthermore, this speed or characteristic distance is found to increase with decreasing 
tolerance. This suggests a possible mapping between systems with overload failures 
and networks with dependency links, where networks with different characteristic 
length of dependency links can serve as a suitable model to describe cascading 
overload failures. This mapping can be useful since overload models usually require 
heavy computations and are therefore limited to small systems, while dependency 
models require significantly less computations, and large systems can be easily 
analyzed. 
 
When a disturbance is detected in networks, the knowledge of spatio-temporal 
propagation properties of cascading failures is essential for predicting and mitigating 
the cascading failures. Meanwhile, realistic cascading failures are usually the result of 
the collective interactions between different processes including overloads and other 
system operation procedures [30-32]. The universal features of overload propagation 
found here across different networks may help to better mitigate realistic cascading 
failure, if combined with the detailed knowledge of other processes including system 
operations and planning procedures. 
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 (a) t=1      (b) t=3            (c) t=5             (d) t=7 
Figure 1: The propagation of the overload failures in the network. We demonstrate 
the step 1, 3, 5 and 7 of the cascading failures on a 200×200 lattice with periodic 
boundary conditions and a Gaussian distribution of weights. The disorder is σ=0.01, the 
initial attack size (in red) is 6 × 6, and the tolerance of system is set to α=0.5. In each 
figure, the deep blue dots stands for the overloaded nodes in the current step, while the 
black ones are the nodes failed in the previous steps. The cyan dots are the functional 
nodes that did not fail.  
  
 Figure 2: Spatio-temporal propagation of cascading overload failures in simulations. 
(a) and (b) are the spreading radius rc(t) of failures and amount of failures at each step, 
Fr(t), as a function of time for α=0.25, σ=0.1 and l=6. (c) and (d) are the results of rc and 
Fr scaled by the system size, including L=70 (triangle), L=80 (square), L=90 (circle) and 
L=100 (diamond), respectively. Note that simulations are limited by the computational 
complexity of the most efficient algorithm for calculating node betweenness, which is 
O(NM+N2logN) for weighted networks, where N is the system size and M is the number 
of edges (NM is the order of N2 for sparse network). 
  
	  
Figure 3:  Theory for overload propagation. The network is embedded in a 2d 
circular plate centered at O with a radius of 1 unit and the initial failure is located at the 
center of the network within a circle of radius a≪1. The ring centered at O and between a 
and b (b>a) is defined as the adjacent ring. A is a random node in the network, whose 
distance to O is r≤1 (here we assume r>b, the case of r≤b can be found in the SI). AF is 
the original path starting from A to a random node F on the system border. Since r>b, the 
intersection points between AF and the circle with radius b are B and E. AF also 
intersects the border of the failure area at C and D. AJ is a straight line tangent to the 
failure area and the tangent point is G. We also define another path AI, which starts from 
A to a border node I by passing through the plate center O. Note that a realistic road 
network is embedded behind the circular plate for demonstration. 
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Figure 4: Theoretical results of overloads propagation. In (a) and (b), the results from 
theory with unit distance resolution 1/R (L=2R is the system linear size) are reported for 
(a) rc and (b) Fr, where α=0.01. In (c) and (d), different symbols stand for different 
resolutions, including 1/200 (triangle), 1/300 (square), 1/400 (circle) and 1/500 
(diamond), respectively. Here the absolute radius of the initial damage is set to 3 units.  
  
  
Figure 5: (a) Relative velocity as a function of tolerance in the theory, models	  as well as 
in real structures. The relative velocity is calculated in the linear regime of rc(t), Δ(rc)/L, 
which decreases with α. The velocity in the theory is multiplied by a constant 2π. We 
find that the velocity is similar in different model networks (lattice, circular lattice, planar 
graph and circular plate) and real networks (road network in Oldenburg or California). (b) 
The average overload as a function of relative distance from the initial attack. The 
overload in the weighted lattice (circle symbol) and theory (dashed line) after the initial 
damage is shown. The results are both shifted by the linear size of the initial damage 
(𝑟!!"#), which makes two results comparable from the initial attack. We also multiplied 
the x axis of theory by 2π, which is consistent with the velocity difference shown in (a). 
 
 
